

AUTHORITIES AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON THE RENT-ORIENTED BEHAVIOR STRATEGY OF SUBSURFACE NATURAL RESOURCE USERS

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The article investigates the issues of the interdependence of authorities and their influence on the formation of a rent-oriented behavior strategy of users of subsurface natural resources. The issues are in focus under the conditions of European integration shifts in the economy of Ukraine and formation of a transparent mechanism for the interaction of subjects of rental relations in the sphere of use of subsurface natural resources. The study uses general scientific and special methods of system-structural analysis to reveal the features of the dual system “right – duty” taking into account the system of goals of the subsurface natural resource users and the government, and creating prerequisites for harmonizing the economic interests of the subjects concerning renting. The purpose of the work is to study the features and analyse the existing mechanisms, models and forms of influence of authorities on the formation of a rent-oriented behavior strategy of subsurface natural resource users. The theoretical study has revealed that the existing models for the deduction of natural rent are rather diverse, but they are based on the distribution and redistribution of ownership rights to the subsurface natural resources with simultaneous rent receiving, rent distribution and rent redistribution. It has been revealed that in the modern economic literature, the definition of “rent” is widely used and treated as surplus income. It has been proved that the problems of rent appropriation by the state are solved by developing a transparent tax mechanism for receiving the rent by the government, the entity who rents the subsurface natural resources and the citizen, as well as solving the problems of allocating a part of the rent proceeds to the restoration of natural resource potential. For this purpose, bonuses, rentals, royalties and taxes are most widely used. The analysis revealed that in order to eliminate the negative manifestations and possible shadowing of renting and rent appropriation, the developed mechanisms of rent-oriented strategies should be predictable and correct, aiming at the agreement of economic interests of the subjects of rental relations and society. Using the defined basic principles of the influence of authorities on the rent-oriented behavior strategy of the subsurface natural resource users, it is expedient to carry out a further step-by-step analysis of the rent-oriented strategy of subsurface natural resource users and the state.

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